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LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-"IF AND WHEN

COURT" LANGUAGE USED BY POLICE OFFICERS IS

AN ADEQUATE RENDERING OF MIRANDA

WARNINGS-Duckworth

v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare'
This maxim originated over 300 years ago as a response to
the unjust interrogation techniques often used in the continental
system.2 American colonists fervently despised the inquisitorial
methods used in the interrogation of the accused.3 They thus
enacted the fifth amendment as a fundamental safeguard against
such inequities.4 The historical development of the privilege
against self-incrimination can be traced to a struggle between the
5
powers vested in government and those afforded individuals.
The adoption of the fifth amendment was not a result of the
changing legal and societal attitudes, but rather a "crystallization
of the doctrine as to confessions." 6 Over a century ago, the
United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of the
privilege against self-incrimination 7 and it remains an integral
I Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896). No one is bound to accuse
himself. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 937 (5th ed. 1979).
2 Brown, 161 U.S. at 596. In Brown, a congressional statute requiring testimony
before the Interstate Commerce Commission came into direct conflict with the fifth
amendment. Id. at 593. The Court held, however, that due to the immunity
granted to the petitioner through the statute, the witness was compelled to answer.
Id. at 610.
3 Id. at 596.
4 See id. at 597. "The states, with one accord, made a denial of the right to
question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which
in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed with the impregnability of
a constitutional enactment." Id.
5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) ("the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government-state or federal-must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens").
6 Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897).
7 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, custom revenue
laws were enacted that forced a defendant to produce certain documents and
materials or have allegations made against him taken as true. Id. at 620. The Court
determined that seizing a man's private papers to be used as evidence of his guilt is
equivalent to requiring self-incrimination and therefore is prohibited by the fifth
amendment. Id. at 633. The Court noted that the fourth and fifth amendments
shared an "intimate relation" because unreasonable searches and seizures are usually made to compel a man to incriminate himself. Id.
Analyzing the Boyd holding, the Court in Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532
(1897), noted:
[T]he provision of the Fifth Amendment securing one accused against
being compelled to testify against himself, and those of the Fourth
Amendment protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures ...
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part of our legal system today.8

The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person.., shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."9
In response to the potential abuses in a law enforcement system
that relies in large part on confessions, 10 the Supreme Court has
held that protective devices are necessary to insure that the privilege against self-incrimination is honored."I As a result, this
privilege has a broad and far-reaching effect in our society.' 2 In
Duckworth v. Eagan,1 3 the Court addressed the right against selfincrimination, and more specifically the safeguards that it had
previously set forth in Miranda v. Arizona. 4 The Court held that
the "if and when you go to court" language used by a police officer to apprise an accused of his right to counsel was an ade15
quate rendering of a Miranda warning.
On May 16, 1982, Gary James Eagan contacted the Chicago
police to report that he had discovered a woman's body on a
Lake Michigan beach.' 6 Eagan then led several officers to the
beach where the woman was found bleeding and crying for
demonstrated that both of these Amendments contemplated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of a constitutional provision, principles of humanity and civil liberty, which had been secured in the mother
country only after years of struggle, so as to implant them in our institutions in the fullness of their integrity, free from the possibilities of future legislative change.
Brain, 168 U.S. at 544 (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 616).
8 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. In Miranda, the Court noted that "the privilege
against self-incrimination-the essential mainstay of our adversary system-is
founded on a complex of values." Id. (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 55-57 & 57 n.5 (1964)).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

10 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964).
11 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The Court noted that "[i]n order to combat these
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against selfincrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights
and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored." Id.
12 The constitution of almost every state has a provision similar to the fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (holding "[t]oday ...there can
be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves").
13 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989).
14 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See infra notes 83-96 and accompanying text for a more
complete discussion of Miranda.
15 Duckworth, 109 S.Ct. at 2876.
16 Id. at 2876-77.
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Although Eagan denied any criminal behavior,' 8 the wo-

man identified him as the man who had stabbed her.'9 Eagan
agreed to go to police headquarters, and was transferred the next
morning to the Hammond, Indiana Police Department where the
officers commenced an investigation. 20 After Eagan signed a
waiver form, the police began questioning him. 2 '

Although

Eagan continued to deny involvement in the previous night's activities, he was placed in lockup at police headquarters.22 After
twenty-nine hours of incarceration, Eagan signed a second waiver
form, 2 3

and the police conducted an additional interview. 24 Dur-

Id. at 2877.
Id. Eagan admitted he had been with the woman earlier that night. Id. However, he claimed the woman was abducted after they were attacked by several men.
Id.
19 Id. On seeing Eagan she exclaimed, "Why did you stab me? Why did you stab
me?" Id. at 2876. Eagan later confessed to stabbing the woman nine times after she
refused to have sexual relations with him. Id. at 2878.
20 Id. at 2877. Chicago Police turned the investigation over to the Hammond,
Indiana Police Department when they learned the crime had been committed in
Indiana's jurisdiction. Id.
21 Id. The relevant portion of the waiver form contained the following:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You
have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against
you in court. You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you
any questions, and to have him with you during questioning. You have this right
to the advice and presence of a lawyer even if you cannot afford to hire
one. We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointedfor you, if
you wish, if and when you go to court. If you wish to answer questions now
without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering questions
at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until
you have talked to a lawyer.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1555-56 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 2877-78. The waiver form provided:
1. Before making this statement, I was advised that I have the
right to remain silent and that anything I might say may or will be used
against me in a court of law.
2. That I have the right to consult with an attorney of my own
choice before saying anything, and that an attorney may be present
while I am making any statement or throughout the course of any conversation with any police officer if I so choose.
3. That I can stop and request an attorney at any time during the
course of the taking of any statement or during the course of any such
conversation.
4. That in the course of any conversation I can refuse to answer
any further questions and remain silent, thereby terminating the conversation.
5. That if I do not hire an attorney, one will be provided for me.
Id. (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1556 (7th Cir. 1988)).
24 Id. at 2877.
17

18
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ing this second interrogation Eagan confessed to stabbing the
woman and subsequently led police to a site where they discovered the knife used in the stabbing as well as several items of
25
clothing.
At trial, the judge overruled Eagan's objection of an improper Miranda warning and allowed into evidence his original
denial of culpability, his subsequent confession, and the recovery
of the knife and clothing.2 6 Based upon this evidence, the jury
found Eagan guilty of attempted murder.2 7 On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected Eagan's claim of an insufficient Miranda warning 28 and consequently he filed a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana. 29 The petition was denied.3 0 A divided United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, reversed.'
The court of appeals found that the warnings were "constitutionally defective because [they] denied an accused indigent a clear
and unequivocal warning of the right to appointed counsel
before any interrogation. ' ' 3 2 The court of appeals remanded the
case to determine if Eagan knowingly waived his right to counsel
in the second interview.3 3 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari after the court of appeals denied a rehearing
en banc.34
The privilege to be free from government intimidation and
self-incrimination has long been established in our country's history and documented in the Bill of Rights. 3 5 It was not until
25 Id. at 2878.
26 Id.
27 Id. The court sentenced Eagan to 35 years imprisonment. Id.
28 Id. The Indiana Supreme Court further ruled that Eagan's statements were

not a result of police coercion or overbearing. Id. at 2881.
29 Id. at 2878.
30 Id. The district court held that "[t]he record clearly manifests adherence to
Miranda." Id.
31 Id. (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1988)). The
court of appeals held that the "if and when you go to court" language found in the
initial waiver form did not clearly represent the accused's right to counsel before
interrogation. Id. The court further stated that it was possible that the first warning

led Eagan to believe he would not be afforded access to a lawyer during interrogation while the second warning did not correct the misinformation. Id. (citing Eagan
v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1558 (7th Cir. 1988)).
32 Id. (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843 F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1988)).
33 Id.

34 Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve lower court
conflicts involving the possible inadequacies of the "if and when you go to court"
language of Miranda warnings. Id.
35 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
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1897, however, that the Supreme Court, in Bram v. United States,36
held that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
applies in all criminal trials when a voluntary confession is at issue. 3 7 In Bram, the defendant, the first officer aboard an American vessel on the high seas, was found guilty of murdering the
ship's captain . 3 8 At trial, a police detective was allowed to testify
to certain statements made by the defendant while he was in police custody.39 The detective represented the defendant's statements as a voluntary confession. 40 The Court noted, however,
that the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements
precluded the finding that the statements were made voluntarily. 4 ' Although this was not the first case dealing with an in-

admissable confession,4 2 the federal conviction was reversed and
the statement made by the accused to a police officer was held
not to be voluntary due to the officer's coercive tactics.43 Justice
White posited that proof of the voluntariness of a confession can
be found by determining the existence of outside and improper
influences.4 4 He further opined that if the man would have
otherwise remained silent, it is irrelevant if the statement was voluntarily made.4 5 Justice White noted that the focus rests solely
36 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
37 Id. at 542. See also infra note 7.
38 Id. at 534. While en route to South America, the ship's captain, his wife, and a
crew member were found murdered. Id. at 535-36. Bram assumed command of
the ship and, acting on suspicion among the crew, ordered that Brown, a seaman,
be seized and placed in irons. Id. at 536. Subsequently, Brown identified Brain as
the murderer and he was placed in irons. Id. at 536-37.
39 Id. at 539-40. While in custody, Brain was informed by the detective that
Brown had made statements claiming that, while at the ship's wheel, he witnessed
Brain kill the captain. Id. at 539. In response, Brain stated that "he could not have
seen me . . . from there" and denied any further knowledge of the incident. Id.
40 Id. at 540. The detective claimed that he did not induce the defendant
through promise, expectation, or advantage, but rather that he obtained a voluntary confession free from influence. Id. at 538-39.
41 Id. at 540. While in the custody of the Halifax police, Brain was taken to a
private office where he was stripped and where "extraordinary liberties" were taken
with him. Id. at 539.
42 See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (common law rule barring involuntary
confessions was invoked without reference to any specific constitutional provision).
See also Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (confession made by a seaman in
irons was held to be voluntary absent threats).
43 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897). The Court noted it was
conceivable that silence on Brain's part would be construed as an admission of
guilt. Id. at 562. Consequently, the statements he gave regarding Brown's accusations could not have been construed to be of a voluntary nature. Id. at 562-63.
44 Id. at 549.
45

Id.
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on whether the statement was freely given.4 6
In 1936, the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Missisippi,4 7 further
extended the meaning of the word "voluntary." The evolution
of the "voluntariness test ' 48 was the result of the Court's focus
on whether confessions that were extorted from defendants were
inconsistent with the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause. 49 In Brown three murder suspects were coerced into confessions after initially professing their innocence. 50 The Court
determined that law enforcement officials severely whipped the
defendants and told them that the whippings would not be
stopped until they confessed to the murder. 5' Noting the appalling way in which the suspects were treated, and stressing that
"the rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the
witness stand, ' 5 2 the Court held that the state can regulate the
procedural aspects of its courts only so long as it does not offend
traditional principles ofjustice that are considered so sacred as to
be fundamental to our lives. 5 3
In the period between 1940 and 1965 there were very few
occasions in which the Court had the opportunity to rule on the
constitutionality of federal interrogations. 54 This was the result
of the enactment of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a)
56
(FRCP 5(a)) 5 5 which was effectuated in McNabb v. United States
46

Id.

47 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
48 This test had its beginnings in Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924), when
the Court held "the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely
that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat." Id. at 14.
49 Brown, 297 U.S. at 279.
50 Id. at 278. The Court noted that a state is free to abolish trial by jury and may
substitute complaint or information for the right to indictment by grand jury. Id. at
285 (citing Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1875)). The Court noted, however,
that "it does not follow that it may substitute trial by ordeal." Id.
51 Id. at 282.
52 Id. at 285-86.
53 Id. at 285. (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). See
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (confessions obtained after repeated inquisitions of prisoners in coercive circumstances are void); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944) (holding defendant's confession invalid due to coercive tactics
stemming from incommunicado measures in which the accused went without sleep
for 36 hours). See also Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1427
(1985) ("the Court defined voluntariness in a technical sense, at odds with the common usage suggesting free will, choice, even spontaneity").
54 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966).
55 The rule states:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the
arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available
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and Mallory v. United States.5 7 In McNabb, several suspects were
arrested after a federal officer was shot and killed.5 8 Instead of
presenting the suspects to a judicial officer, as was required
under FRCP 5(a), law enforcement officials took them to a detention center, where, after several days of questioning, the suspects
made incriminating statements.5 9
The trial court admitted the statements as voluntary and the
suspects were convicted of murder.60 The United States
Supreme Court, however, reversed. 6 ' Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, found a constitutional examination of the
method used to procure the incriminating statements unnecessary.6 2 The Justice emphasized that the failure to immediately
bring the suspects before a judicial officer was a direct violation
of the criminal procedures established by Congress. 6 1 Such safeguards, stressed the Court, were necessary to guard against overzealous law enforcement officers who practice the "third degree"
and consider it a useful interrogation technique. 64
Similarly in Mallory, a suspect convicted of rape in a federal
district court had been unnecessarily detained before seeing a
magistrate. 6 5 Several officers interrogated Mallory and commenced questioning by informing him that his brother had alcommissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit
persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States.
When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
56 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
57 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
58 McNabb, 318 U.S. at 334. McNabb involved Tennessee mountaineers engaged
in the selling of untaxed whiskey. Id. at 333. On the night of the shooting, several
officers of the Alcohol Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue encountered the
mountaineers as they were loading illegal whiskey into a car. Id. at 334. When the
officers arrived the bootleggers ran into a nearby cemetery. Id. While apprehending the suspects, one officer was shot dead and another was shot and slightly
wounded. Id.
59 Id. at 334-38.
60 Id. at 333. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sustained the
convictions. Id.
61 Id. at 347.
62 Id. at 340.
63 Id. at 344. In referring to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), the Court
stated: "Legislation . . . requiring that the police must with reasonable promptness
show legal cause for detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important safeguard-not only in assuring protection for the innocent but also in securing conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a progressive and selfconfident society." Id. at 343-44.
64 Id. at 344.
65 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 450-51 (1957).
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ready given a statement naming him as the rapist.6 6 The Court
opined that "[s]ince such unwarranted detention led to tempting
utilization of intensive interrogation," 6 7 FRCP 5(a) must be triggered to act as a barrier against these types of potentialities.6 8 In
both McNabb and Mallory, Justice Frankfurter sent a strong
message that FRCP 5(a) commanded that "unnecessary delays
from the time of arrest to arraignment," would be strictly
enforced .69
In 1964, a pivotal decision was reached in Malloy v. Hogan.7"
In Malloy, a man arrested during a gambling raid was ordered to
answer questions before a referee appointed by the Connecticut
Superior Court.7 ' When the man refused, "on the grounds that
it may tend to incriminate [him]," the superior court found him
in contempt and ordered him jailed until he agreed to cooperate.7 2 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held that the fourteenth amendment protects against a state infringement of the self-incrimination right, just as the fifth amendment does in the federal context.7 3 Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, asserted that the same standard must apply to "determine whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is justified."7 4 Consequently, the Court concluded that
the nature of the questions could have resulted in injurious disclosure, and therefore, the state court's action suggested a violation of the self-incrimination privilege. 75 The extension of the
self-incrimination privilege to the states had a tremendous and
far-reaching effect on the law and its relationship to law
enforcement.7 6
66
67

Id. at 450.
Id. at 453.

68 Id. at 456.
69 See McNabb, 318 U.S. at 347; Mallory, 354 U.S. at 455-56.
70 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
71 Id. at 11. The referee inquired as to the identity of the suspect's employer as
well as those responsible for paying his counsel fees, fines, and bail. Id. at 12.
Although the suspect admitted guilt to the gambling misdemeanor, he refused to
reply to any questions concerning his relationship with a man who was currently
under investigation by the state and suspected of engaging in unlawful activity. Id.
at 12-13. Further, he refused to disclose the identity of the tenant in whose apartment he was arrested. Id. The interrogation was part of a sweeping inquiry into
criminal activity in the area and was designed to elicit information that might connect the petitioner with related recent crimes. Id. at 13.
72 Id. at 3.
73 Id. at 8.
74 Id. at 11.
75 Id. at 14 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)).
76 The shift of the federal standard to state cases "reflects recognition that the
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Prior to the Malloy decision, the Court had extended the
voluntariness test" to all situations where "interrogation practices [were] ...likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as
to disable him from making a free and rational choice." '7 7 The
implications of the Court's extension of the voluntariness test
was expressed in Escobedo v. Illinois.7 8 In Escobedo, the Court ruled
that a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel occurred
when the police refused to grant the petitioner's request to speak
to his attorney during an interrogation prior to being charged. 7 9
During the interrogation the petitioner made several incriminat80
ing statements which were used in convicting him in state court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Goldberg asserted that "[o]ur
Constitution .. . strikes the balance in favor of the right of the
accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against selfincrimination."-8 ' Escobedo was the harbinger for the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona.8 2
In Miranda, the Court focused on four separate criminal
prosecutions with similar fact patterns.8" The Court addressed
American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial." Id. at 7
(citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961)).
77 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464-65 (1965) (citing Lisenba v. California,
314 U.S. 219 (1941)). In Lisenba, Justice Roberts stressed that police must obtain
confessions by using methods that comport with a standard of basic fairness.
Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 236. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). In Gallegos
the police obtained a voluntary confession from a fourteen-year-old boy regarding
his role in an assault and battery of an elderly man who later died as a result of the
beating. Id. at 49-50. While the boy was properly advised of his right to counsel,
he did not request the presence of either an attorney or his parents during questioning. Id. at 54. Justice Douglas, finding the confession inadmissible and reversing the boy's conviction, stressed that ajuvenile could not be compared to an adult
because a youth is unlikely to comprehend the consequences of his statements due
to his immaturity. Id. Although the confession was voluntary, acknowledged the
Court, the surrounding circumstances (principally the failure of police to have an
attorney or his parents present) deprived the juvenile of due process. Id. at 55. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the voluntariness test.
78 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
79 Id. at 479-80.
80 Id. at 483-84.
81 Id. at 488.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 465-66. The Court addressed all the prosecutions together because
"they . .. share salient features-incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without
full warnings of constitutional rights." Id. at 445. Ernesto Miranda was arrested
and questioned by police officers without being apprised of his right to consult with
an attorney. Id. at 491. He signed a statement which admitted his confession and
contained a typed-in clause stating that he had full knowledge of all his legal rights.
Id. at 492. Consolidated in Miranda was Vignera v. New York which concerned
Michael Vignera's oral admission of a robbery after he was picked up by detectives.
82
83
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the problem of the admissibility of statements taken during custodial interrogations 84 and expanded on the holding of Escobedo
v. Illinois.8 5 Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion which
stated that unless certain procedural safeguards against self-incrimination are adhered to, exculpatory -or inculpatory statements obtained during custodial interrogations cannot be used
by the prosecution.8 6 In the absence of such safeguards, the
Court determined the proper warnings which must be afforded
the accused.8 7 Justice Harlan filed a scathing dissent in which he
Id. at 493. At trial, the defense was precluded from establishing that no warnings
were given when the prosecution's objections to such questions were sustained. Id.
at 493. In Westover v. United States, the third case consolidated in Miranda, the
facts revealed that Carl Westover was arrested as a suspect in two robberies and
that he was wanted by the FBI on a felony charge. Id. at 494-95. After being questioned by local police officers for an extended period of time, the FBI proceeded to
interrogate him. Id. at 494-95. Several hours later, Westover signed confessions to
each of the robberies. Id. at 495. The last case consolidated within the Miranda
decision was California v. Stewart. Roy Allen Stewart was arrested in connection
with several purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims had died. Id. at 497.
After being interrogated on nine different occasions in a period of five days, he
admitted robbing the deceased. Id. There was no indication that Stewart was advised of his rights. Id. at 497-98.
84 Id. at 445-56.
85 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Escobedo Court held that the sixth amendment right
to counsel exists from the time of arrest. Id. at 490-91. Previously, it was taken as
settled that warnings were not required in pre-trial interrogation as a condition of
the admission of a defendant's statements. See Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S.
613 (1896); Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303 (1912).
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to
consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him
of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has
been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth
Amendment ......
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91.
86 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Court noted that the procedural safeguards
must be "fully effective means" by which an accused can be informed of his right to
silence. Id. Furthermore, the definition of custodial interrogation was set out by
the Court as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
87 Id. The Court explained that:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
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stated that the proposed requirements would not prevent police
brutality or coercive tactics, but would "negate all pressures, []
reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately [] discourage any confession at all." 88
The Miranda decision is one of our country's best known
criminal cases. 89 The precedent set forth stands for those rights
which all criminal suspects must be accorded.9 0 Consequently,
the cases following Miranda dealt with discrete aspects of the decision.9 ' In Orozco v. Texas,9 2 the Supreme Court interpreted the
concept of custodial interrogation. The Orozco Court was
presented a situation in which four police officers had entered
the defendant's bedroom and elicited damaging information
without first giving Miranda warnings.9 3 Relying on precedent, 4
and on an officer's testimony that Orozco was not free to leave
during questioning, the majority held that Miranda warnings
were necessary when the person being interrogated was in custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his freedom of action.95 However, the Court pointed out that its decision should
88 Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart and White joined Justice
Harlan's dissent which reasoned that the "Court's unspoken assumption that any
pressure violates the privilege is not supported by the precedents and it has failed
to show why the Fifth Amendment prohibits that relatively mild pressure the Due
Process Clause permits." Id. at 513 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
89 Caplan, supra note 53, at 1418.
90 Id. See also Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987)
(concluding Miranda reassures suspects who fear abuse, reduces the pressure inherent in interrogation and provides some of the same safeguards that suspects are
granted in formal proceedings). Miranda also had the effect of overruling previous
cases. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) (denial of the accused's request for counsel is only violative of the due process clause if the subsequent trial
lacks "basic fairness"); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) (holding no constitutional violation existed when suspect's specific request for counsel was denied by
the state police questioning him).
9' See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
92 394 U.S. 324 (1969). See Special Project, D.C.C.A. Project, 23 How. L.J. 205,
208 (1980). See also Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) (extending "custodial interrogation" so that Miranda warnings must be given prior to questioning an
individual incarcerated for a separate offense); United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564 (1976) (finding an interrogation in a grand jury proceeding is not considered "custodial interrogation").
93 Orozco, 394 U.S. at 325.
94 See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). Mathis was questioned by an
Internal Revenue agent while in state prison. Id. at 2. He did not receive any warnings that evidence he gave could be used against him. Id. at 2-3. However, documents and oral statements were introduced at trial and he was subsequently
convicted. Id. at 3. The Supreme Court held that tax investigations are not immune from the Miranda requirement and petitioner was entitled to the warnings of
his right to be silent and to have counsel. Id. at 5.
95

Orozco, 394 U.S. at 327.
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not be construed as an expansion of Miranda.96
In 1981, however, an exception to the usual constrictive Mi-

randa analysis was established in Edwards v. Arizona.9 7 In Edwards,

the petitioner requested the assistance of counsel during an in98
terrogation after being informed of his right to do so.

Although questioning ceased at this time, the police interrogated
him again the next day despite his verbal reluctance.9 9 Justice
White determined that when the right to counsel is invoked during custodial interrogation, waiver of that right is not established
when the suspect responds to interrogation initiated by the police.' 0 0 The Justice also added that a valid waiver must be voluntary and "constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or
1
abandonment of a known right or privilege."''
Although the Court has been willing to loosely interpret Miranda warnings in the area of custodial interrogations, efforts to
extend Miranda further have been rebuffed. 1 2 Further, the Miranda decision has been undermined to some extent, 10 3 as illusId.
451 U.S. 477 (1981). But see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). The
Innis Court held that the petitioner was subject to "subtle compulsion" when two
police officers engaged in a conversation that prompted defendant to disclose
where he had discarded the murder weapon. Id. at 302-03. In holding that an "interrogation" had not taken place, the Court concluded there was no violation of
Miranda rights. Id. at 303.
98 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487. The Court observed that Miranda had classified
distinctions between requests for counsel and those to remain silent and concluded
that interrogation ceases only if counsel was requested. Id. at 485 (citing Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 n.10 (1975)).
99 Id. at 487.
96
97

100 Id. at 484.
101 Id. at 482. See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (holding that

the government must sustain a heavy burden of proof for an effective waiver to
exist).
102 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S 412 (1986) (holding a suspect's rights are not
violated when the police fail to inform the defendant of his attorney's efforts to
contact him); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) (refusing to extend Miranda
to include new warnings by rejecting a requirement that the claimant be warned
concerning the crimes which will be the subject of interrogation); Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (denying application of Miranda rights to the questioning of a probationer by a probation officer); United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564 (1976) (finding Miranda rights do not apply to questioning of a targeted
witness before a grand jury); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (determining Miranda rights do not apply to the questioning of a suspected burglar by the
police when the suspect was free to leave at any time); Beckwith v. United States,
425 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding Miranda rights do not apply to the questioning of a
suspect at his home by Internal Revenue Service officers); Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157 (1986) (a waiver is voluntary as long as it is not the product of governmental coercion).
103 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding the defendant's pre-trial
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trated by the decision of Oregon v. Elstad.'0 4 In Elstad, police
officers questioned the respondent at his home after a witness
implicated him in the burglary of a neighbor's house."5 An officer testified that after informing the respondent of his suspicions regarding the respondent's involvement in the robbery, the
respondent admitted that he was at the scene."' It was only after
the respondent was transported to police headquarters, over one
hour later, that Miranda rights were first issued. 0 7 Subsequent to
being given his rights, the respondent confessed to police that he
led several men to the burglarized residence where he pointed
out a defective sliding-glass door which would allow them easy
access.'0 8 The Court was thus presented with the question of
whether the delay in issuing the respondent's Miranda warnings
"tainted" subsequent admissions.' 0 9 Although the police had
elicited an earlier voluntary but unwarned admission from the
suspect, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the self-incrimination
clause does not require the suppression of a confession made after proper Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights." 0 In
concluding that courts should avoid any rigid rule, Justice
O'Connor stressed that the determination of the voluntariness of
a statement should take into account the totality of circumstances
as well as the overall conduct of the police."'
It was against this background that the United States
Supreme Court rendered its decision in Duckworth v. Eagan." 2
The Court began its analysis by reviewing its prior holding in
Miranda in which procedural safeguards for custodial interrogastatements obtained in violation of Miranda can be used for purposes of impeachment if the defendant takes the stand and gives an inconsistent story). See also New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (establishing the "overriding need" rule
which created a public safety exception to the Miranda warnings); United States v.
Gouveia 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (sixth amendment right to counsel can attach no earlier than the filing of an indictment or the initial appearance of the defendant in
court to answer charges).
104 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
105 Id. at 300.
106 Id. at 301.
107 Id.
108 Id. The trial court admitted the confession and convicted Elstad of first-degree burglary. Id. at 302.
109 Id. at 300.
110 Id. at 318.

I'' Id.
112 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989). ChiefJustice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the
Court in which Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined. Id. at 2876.
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tions were established. 1 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, noted that the exact form of warnings professed in
Miranda need not be followed and an effective equivalent would
suffice." 4 The Court determined that since interrogations do
not always occur in a station-house setting," 5 a police officer may
not have access to printed Miranda forms and departures from
the standard routine may occur. 1 6 In reasoning that it is not the
warnings themselves but the right against self-incrimination that
is constitutionally protected, the Court held that a general inquiry to determine
if a suspect's rights were conveyed is all that is
7
necessary. 1

The ChiefJustice next addressed the specific warnings given
to the respondent by the police.' " The Court determined that
the court of appeals misunderstood the "if and when you go to
court" language utilized in the warnings." 9 The Court opined
that the instruction given was an accurate reflection of the state's
procedure for appointment of counsel.' 20 Moreover, the Court
reasoned that the "if and when you go to court" language anticipates a suspect's likely question of when his counsel will be
retained. 121

The Court further held that there is no requirement that attorneys be producible on call. 122 In emphasizing that Miranda
did not require a "station-house lawyer", Justice Rehnquist held
that the police must refrain from questioning a suspect unless a
valid waiver is obtained. 123 Additionally, the Court distinguished
113 Id. at 2879. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of Miranda.
114 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2879 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476
(1966)).
115 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (police car); New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (supermarket); Orozco v Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969)
(bedroom).
116 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2879-80.
117 Id. at 2880 (citing California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). The Court added, "[r]eviewing courts therefore
... need not examine Miranda warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms
of an easement." Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. Under Indiana law, the defendant is given counsel on his initial appearance in court at which time formal charges must be made. Id. See IND. CODE §§ 3533-7-6, 35-33-7-3(a) (1988).
121 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880.
122 Id.
123 Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)). The Court empha-
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the case of California v. Prysock, 124 on which both the respondent
and the court of appeals relied. 2 5 The Court concluded that the
wrong in Prysock, failure to apprise the suspect of his right to
counsel if he agreed to answer questions, was not present in this
case and the warnings were sufficient to convey the aforementioned right. 12 6 As a result of holding the Miranda warnings sufficient, 127 the Chief Justice admitted the knife, 8 clothing and
2
respondent's denial of culpability into evidence.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a lengthy
concurrence to address the applicability of the exclusionary rule
in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 2 9 While relying on the
rationale of Stone v. Powell, 3 ' Justice O'Connor posited that the
respondent should be barred from bringing a claim that was previously litigated in the state courts and which had been given
"plenary consideration" by eighteen judges.' 3 ' Holding that
both the Miranda and exclusionary rules were only protective devices used to insure adherence to constitutional values, Justice
sized that Eagan specifically waived his right to counsel. Id. See supra note 23 for
the text of the waiver form Eagan signed.
124 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam). In Prysock, police officers administered Miranda warnings during a custodial interrogation in which a minor was questioned
about his role in a heinous murder. Id. at 356. The police strayed from the usual
order in which the warnings were given, however, by telling the suspect that he
"had the right to talk to a lawyer before" he was questioned and to have him present during questioning, and only later apprised him that he had "the right to have a
lawyer appointed to represent" him at no cost. Id. at 356-57. The Prysock Court
distinguished two earlier cases, People v. Bolinski, 260 Cal. App. 2d 705, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 347 (1968) and United States v. Garcia, 431 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1970) which
held "the reference to appointed counsel was linked to a future point in time after
police interrogation, and therefore did not fully advise the suspect of his right to
appointed counsel before such interrogation." Pysock, 453 U.S. at 360. Determining the suspect's rights were clearly conveyed, the Court held the court of appeals
erred in basing its decision on the order in which the Miranda warnings were given.
Id. at 361.
125 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880-81.
126 Id. at 2881. The Court explained that out of the eight sentences given in the
warnings, one described respondent's right to stop answering questions until he
talked to a lawyer and another conveyed his right to counsel before questioning
began. Id.
127 Id. The Court did not consider the question of whether the initial warnings
had any effect on the respondent's second statements. Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
130 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Stone, the Court held that "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim .... a
state prisoner [may not] be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his
trial." Id. at 482.
131 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2882 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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O'Connor determined that they were not constitutional rights in
and of themselves. 13 2 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor held that
these rules must be considered in view of other societal interests.' 3 3 In applying a balancing test, Justice O'Connor argued
that the marginal gain achieved through increased police adherence to Miranda is far outweighed by the detrimental effect to
society's interest in an efficient and effective criminal justice

system. 134
In reasoning that relitigation of Miranda claims will not only
be ineffective as a deterrent of violative police behavior, Justice
O'Connor stated that it would have the undesirable effect of increasing the number of admittedly guilty criminals on the street,
as well as creating more conflict in the delicate setting in which
lower federal courts review state supreme court decisions. 135
Justice O'Connor also distinguished direct review of criminal
convictions as opposed to those collaterally attacked in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding. 136 In doing so, the Justice held that
the balance shifts towards the unavailability of the suppression
of
remedy because the burden imposed on society in the13form
7
heavy.
too
becomes
criminals
for
increased advantages
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan in full, and by
justices Blackmun and Stevens in part,' 3 8 disagreed with the majority's characterization of the Miranda decision. 3 9 Reasoning
that "if and when you go to court" language often misleads a
Id. at 2883 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id.Justice O'Connor continued: "In the name of efficient judicial administration of the Fifth Amendment guarantee and the need to create institutional respect
for Fifth Amendment values, it sacrifices society's interest in uncovering evidence
of crime and punishing those who violate its laws." Id.
134 Id. at 2882-83 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice O'Connor
noted, "the marginal possibility that police adherence to Miranda will be enhanced
by suppression of highly probative evidence some seven years after the police conduct at issue in this case is far outweighed by the harm to society's interest in punishing and incapacitating those who violate its criminal laws." Id. at 2882
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
135 Id. at 2884 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136 Id. at 2883 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137 Id. at 2884 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Federal habeas corpus review "disturbs the State's significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies society the right to punish some admitted offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct.
....
Id. at 2883
.
1038, 1053 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
138 Id. at 2885 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Stevens did not
join injustice Marshall's treatment of federal habeas corpus review as addressed by
Justice O'Connor's concurrence. Id.
139 Id. at 2886 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132
133
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suspect into believing he will not be provided counsel until after
questioning, Justice Marshall "refuse[d] to acquiesce in the continuing debasement of this historic precedent."'' 40 In commencing his analysis, Justice Marshall reiterated the strong
requirements needed to fulfill a valid Miranda warning.' 4' Justice
Marshall then scrutinized the specific warning given, and concluded that because Eagan could have easily misinterpreted the
14
warning, he would have been unsure of his rights at best. 1
In faulting the majority's holding, Justice Marshall concluded that it was inappropriate to fail to take into consideration
the reality of an interrogation. 41 Justice Marshall opined that
even in the unlikely event a suspect comprehends the warnings,
he still will have no knowledge as to when his court appearance,
and thus receipt of counsel, will take place. 144 Furthermore, Justice Marshall illuminated the pressure police officers can exert
1 45
with the "threat of an indefinite deferral of interrogation. 1
Justice Marshall also expressed his dismay with the majority's flippant dismissal of California v. Prysock. 1 4 6 The Justice
stated that the Prysock decision held, by distinguishing several
lower court decisions, that warnings are defective when "the reference to the right to appointed counsel was linked with some
future point in time. "147 Since Eagan was subjected to this defect
in his initial warning, Justice Marshall could not reconcile the maId.
Id. He explained that Miranda mandated a "clear and unequivocal offer to
provide appointed counsel prior to questioning" or a "fully effective equivalent" as
an alternative. Id.
142 Id. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall agreed with the court of
appeals, finding that "Eagan could easily have concluded from the 'if and when'
caveat that only 'those accused who can afford an attorney have the right to have
one present before answering any questions; those who are not so fortunate must
wait.' " Id. at 2886-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Eagan v. Duckworth, 843
F.2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1988)).
143 Id. at 2887 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that "the recipients of police warnings are often frightened suspects unlettered in the law, not
lawyers or judges or others schooled in interpreting legal or semantic nuance." Id.
144 Id. Furthermore, Justice Marshall added that the confusion would be exacerbated because the "going to court" terminology is synonymous with "going to
trial" in everyday usage, and the determination of when counsel will be provided
hinges on this. Id.
145 Id. at 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146 Id. Justice Marshall posited that the Prysock decision dealt directly with
Eagan's claim of insufficient Miranda warnings. Id. Furthermore, the majority's misinterpretation of Miranda was consequently heightened. See supra note 112 for a
further discussion of Prysock.
147 Duckworth, 109 S.Ct. at 2888 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting California v.
Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 360 (1981) (per curiam)).
140
141
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jority's reasoning. 4 8 In concluding his first point, Justice Marshall posited that it would be simple to rectify the present
circumstances by redrafting the Miranda forms to eradicate the
ambiguities."' 9 In support of his assertion, Justice Marshall compared the clarity of the warnings used by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation 150 with those given Eagan.' 5 '
In the second part of his dissent, Justice Marshall expressed
his obvious disdain for Justice O'Connor's position in her concurrence. 5 2 In reiterating his reasons for dissenting in the Stone
decision,1 5 3 Justice Marshall determined that there is no basis for
an extension of Stone because it was erroneous when originally
decided.' 5" The Justice further stated that it is not the Supreme
Court's place to determine the scope of jurisdiction, but one of
congressional choice,' 55 and consequently it is Congress who
must weigh the competing interests Justice O'Connor referred to
in her concurrence. 56 Furthermore,Justice Marshall argued that
claims such as "prosecutorial misconduct, double jeopardy, or
the right to a speedy trial, could never be cognizable on federal
148

Id. at 2889 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

149 Id.

150 Id. The standard FBI warnings are as follows:
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used
against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice
before we ask you any questions and to have a lawyer with you during
questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you
before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions
now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any
time until you talk to a lawyer.
Id. at 2879 n.4.
151 Id. at 2889 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152 Id. More specifically, Justice Marshall stated, "Her concurring opinion evinces
such a palpable distaste for collateral review of state court judgments that it can
only be viewed as a harbinger of future assaults on federal habeas corpus." Id. at
2889-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 2890 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall agreed with Justice
Brennan who argued that the majority's decision in Stone "portends substantial
evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction." Id. at 2889 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 503 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
154 Id. at 2890 (Marshall,J., dissenting). TheJustice explained that he scrutinized
the habeas statute and found there was no language to infer that certain federal
claims should not be afforded collateral review. Id.
155 Id. Article III, section 1 of the Constitution provides that "The judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1.
156 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2890 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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habeas" under Justice O'Connor's view which
narrows the scope
1 57
claims.
guilt-related
to
review
habeas
of
In addition to attacking Justice O'Connor's stance on federal
habeas review, Justice Marshall further addressed his colleague's
"profound distaste for Miranda."'58 In assuming arguendo that
the Stone decision was correct, Justice Marshall contended that it
should not be extended further.' 5 9 The Justice pointed out that
Stone was distinguishable from the present case, because when
Miranda rights are violated, statements taken are presumptively
unreliable, whereas seized physical evidence is not. 16 In further
delineating differences between claims based on the exclusionary
rule and claims based on Miranda,Justice Marshall stressed that
the only function of the exclusionary rule is police deterrence
while Miranda rights "go to the heart of our accusatorial
1
system."'

' 6

Justice Marshall also opposed Justice O'Connor's treatment
of "voluntary statements" as "non-constitutional" Miranda
claims. 162 In holding that there are no such claims, Justice Marshall relied on prior authority 163 which determined that a statement is not considered "voluntary" unless Miranda standards
were complied with.' 64 Even conceding the existence of "nonconstitutional" Miranda claims, Justice Marshall declared that it
would be impossible to discover which petitioner's statements
would be considered "voluntary" for purposes of applying the
Stone rationale. 16 5 Justice Marshall reasoned that Congress has
157 Id. at 2891 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall contended that Justice
O'Connor failed to consider defendant's rights that are not guilt related but still
deserve collateral protection. Id.
158 Id. Justice Marshall challenged Justice O'Connor's statement that "no significant federal values are at stake" when Miranda claims are raised in federal habeas
corpus proceedings. Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. at 2884
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied by Justice Marshall).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 2892 (Marshall,J., dissenting). TheJustice went on to conclude that the
requirements "serve to protect 'a criminal suspect's exercise of [a] privilege which
is one of the distinctive components of our criminal law.' " Id. (quoting White v.
Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 893 (7th Cir. 1982)).
162

Id.

See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 465-66 (1974) (observing that Miranda's
purpose was to assure that the self-incrimination clause would be upheld by the
constitutional standards enunciated in that decision); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S.
324, 326 (1969) (holding admissions obtained without the required warnings violates the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment as set forth in Miranda).
164 Duckworth, 109 S.Ct. at 2892 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165 Id. Thus, to determine the applicability of Stone, federal habeas courts must
163
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already used a balancing process and the Court should not inquire into which claims should be granted collateral federal
review. 166
The Duckworth decision is not a radical break from the recent
treatment of Miranda cases but, on the contrary, the continuation
of a rather slow and methodic retreat from the strong safeguards
originally set forth in 1966.167 Once Miranda was heralded as a
bold and innovative decision designed to uphold our sacred Bill
of Rights 68 and granted even the most violent criminal some degree of respect. 16 9 Presently, however, Miranda lies on the edge
of obsolescence, a despised formality for the police, forced to adhere to it, and a nebulous right often beyond an accused's comprehension. 7 ° Although the courts have derogated from the
stringency of the Miranda decision, it nevertheless remains good
law. It is unfortunate that the Court did not use Duckworth as a
stepping stone to decrease the ambiguities of Miranda warnings
and more importantly, steer Miranda law back to a position as
guardian of an accused's right against self-incrimination.
The majority correctly holds that Mirandawarnings need not
be given in the exact form prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona 1" but
falters in its treatment of the "if and when you go to court" language. While the Court acknowledged that the primary consideration in such an issue is whether or not the advisement
reasonably conveys a suspect's rights,' 7 2 it ignored the implications that confusing legal jargon will have. Miranda forms, such
as those used by Indiana law enforcement officials, only exacerbate the existing problem.
make a prior inquiry into the type of Miranda claim being brought. Id. at 2892-93
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 2893 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing statements obtained in
violation of Miranda to be used as evidence to cast doubts on a defendant's credibility). See also Caplan, supra note 53, at 1418 (stating that since Hai-s, the Court has
avoided opportunities to extend Miranda and even diminished its principles);
Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 AKRON L. REV. 177, 182 (1984) (reasoning that the present Court's treatment of fifth amendment cases "has consigned
Escobedo to the ash heap of legal history and Miranda is twisting slowly in the wind").
168 "The fifth amendment .. . reveals an unwillingness to wage all-out war on
crime, even heinous crime, lest other values be demeaned." Caplan, supra note 53,
at 1471.
169 Id.
170 See Goldberg, supra note 155, at 181 (proclaiming that suspects usually do not
understand the meaning behind the Miranda warnings they receive).
171 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2879. See supra note 86-87 and accompanying text.
172 Duckworth, 109 S. Ct. at 2880.
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In a society that prides itself on the equity and fairness afforded its citizens through the criminal justice system, the present apathy of the Court toward a suspect's Miranda rights is
alarming. The travesty becomes more acute upon realization of
such a simple remedy. As Justice Marshall lucidly opined,
"[d]eleting the sentence containing the offending language is all
that needs to be done."'' 7 3 Miranda warnings were always considered a prophylactic device to insure the accused's constitutional
right against self-incrimination.' 74 It is consequently illogical to
refuse to make the warnings more comprehensible to the very
class of people who are in most desperate need of its protection.
The very reason for creating such a device is degraded when it is
applied in such a way that it is too difficult for the lay person to
understand. The FBI warnings, referred to in Justice Marshall's
dissent, 7 5 should act as a model of clarity on which all law enforcement agencies can rely. The straightforward language utilized would satisfy a standard of the "reasonable conveyance of a
suspect's rights" and consequently cases such as those at bar
would need never be litigated.
The ease with which the aforementioned solution can be arrived at and the majority's refusal to address it is the most disturbing aspect of the Duckworth decision. It implies that the
Court is not willing to make any concessions to uphold Miranda's
usefulness but rather curb its effectiveness altogether. The majority's suggestion that Miranda warnings need only "touch all
bases" 171 is a clear sign of the gray area in which Miranda pres17 7
ently is situated. The Court must take a firm stand either way.
Ideally, a concise and clear Miranda warning that would apprise
the accused of his right against self-incrimination is the ultimate
goal. However, the Court's predilection towards limiting Miranda and society's changing views are evidence of the Court's
willingness to abrogate Miranda's usefulness and perhaps overrule this historic precedent in the not too distant future. In so
doing, the Court will most likely adopt the premise that "It]he
ultimate issue is whether the government proceeded fairly, in a
173 Id. at 2889 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 2880.
175 Id at 2889 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

Id at 2880.
Caplan, supra note 53, at 1475. In addition Caplan posited that there was no
room for a middle ground and a choice must be made between "government or
subversion." Id.
176
177
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proper manner, not whether the suspect knew his rights." 78 In
any event, the Court must assert itself and decide the fate of Miranda rather than allowing it to remain a formality with little
meaning.
Gregory G. Tole
178 Id.

